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Abstract
Precarious work, or employment that is associated with temporary contracts,
low earnings and limited or no employee representation, is on the rise. From
an operations perspective, these practices should enable flexibility and reduce
costs. However, from the perspective of most other social sciences, precarious
work harms workers and should harm firm performance. The objective of this
research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the performance implica-
tions of precarious work. We collected survey data in the UK from multiple
respondents (operations and human resource managers) along with secondary
data to explore how the use of precarious work affects a company's financial,
operational and occupational health & safety performance. The results were
mixed. Precarious work did not have a significant influence on occupational
health & safety performance and had a negative relationship with cost perfor-
mance. We also established an inverted u-shaped relationship between precari-
ous work and flexibility and financial performance; low levels of precarious
work improve flexibility and financial performance and high levels of precari-
ous work harm both. Finally, we explored if high-performance work practices
could moderate these relationships, but the results were mostly insignificant.
The results suggest that firms only benefit from relatively low levels of adop-
tion of precarious work.
KEYWORD S
occupational health & safety, operational performance, precarious work, sustainability
1 | INTRODUCTION
Firms are adopting a number of nonstandard or precari-
ous forms of operational work such as using temporary
or contractual workers, with low remuneration and lim-
ited opportunities for employee participation. These types
of contractual arrangements prevail in service and
manufacturing industries alike (McKay et al., 2012)
and they are steadily becoming more prevalent
(Sperman, 2013; TUC, 2019). OECD research conducted
in 26 European countries showed that over half of the
jobs created between 2007 and 2013 were precarious. In
the US, the percentage of precarious workers rose from
10.7% in 2005 to 17.2% in 2015 (Kalleberg &
Vallas, 2018). Similarly, in the UK, the level of precarious
work rose by more than 27% between 2011 and 2019,
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with 1 in 10 UK workers in precarious employment in
2019 (TUC, 2019). These are trends that the Covid-19
pandemic amplified globally (Matilla-Santander
et al., 2021). This work is precarious, because the uncer-
tain working hours translate into volatility in earnings
and irregular schedules that negatively affect workers
and their families.
Anecdotally, adopting these forms of work will
increase flexibility, reduce costs, and shift some risks
from the firm to the workers (e.g., ILO, 2011). Empirical
operations management (OM) research has also typically
concluded that precarious forms of work reduce costs
and increase flexibility and thus ultimately improve
financial performance (e.g., Kesavan et al., 2014). How-
ever, research in other disciplines such as human
resource management, industrial relations and sociology
indicates that jobs with these precarious characteristics
can harm workers. Precarity reduces their job perfor-
mance, which should in turn harm organizational
performance (Benavides et al., 2000; Fisher & Connelly,
2017; Quinlan et al., 2001). As a result, there is an ongo-
ing debate as to the true costs and benefits of adopting
precarious work.
This is a critical but complicated debate. The conclu-
sions from the OM literature that these forms of work
benefit the firm are mainly based on analytical models
that do not consider how workers' job characteristics,
well-being and job performance are affected. In contrast,
most of the worker-focused literature on precariousness
investigates job characteristics and worker outcomes,
such as income insecurity and health, without empiri-
cally exploring if the adoption of these forms of work is
actually benefiting the firm. The result is that the perfor-
mance implications of precarious work have been
operationalized in numerous ways, at different levels of
analysis and from multiple perspectives.
The objective of this research is to provide a compre-
hensive analysis of the performance implications of pre-
carious work by integrating the OM literature with
research on precarious job characteristics. Thus, we ana-
lyze the costs and benefits of precarious work for firms,
including the implications for occupational health and
safety (OHS). Specifically, we pose the following research
question: How does the use of precarious work affect a
company's operational, financial and occupational
health & safety performance?
High-performance work practices (HPWP) can help to
develop and leverage human capital through increasing
the workforce's knowledge, skills, and autonomy. Hence,
HPWP may mitigate the harm to workers from adopting
precarious work and/or explain why research on the per-
formance impact of precarious work finds mixed results.
This leads to our second research question: Does the use of
high-performance work practices moderate the relationship
between precarious work and a company's operational,
financial and occupational health & safety performance?
To answer these questions, we collected data from
manufacturing firms located in the UK. While precarious
work has increased in all sectors (McKay et al., 2012), we
focus on manufacturing for three reasons. First, the ser-
vice sector is highly diverse and many “gig economy”
(e.g., Kaine & Josserand, 2019) workers in services have
some but not all attributes of being in precarious employ-
ment. For instance, while food delivery drivers and free-
lance consultants both typically work on temporary
contracts, the consultant is not deemed to be in precari-
ous employment because of their high remuneration.
Second, permanent manufacturing jobs have long been
the benchmark for good employment without necessitat-
ing higher-level education, hence the focus in economics
on the loss of these jobs in the USA and Europe
(e.g., Pierce & Schott, 2016). Finally, the role of an
engaged operational workforce to create competitive
advantage (e.g., Flynn et al., 1995; Fynes & Voss, 2001)
has long been studied in manufacturing settings; situat-
ing this study in both that literature as well as the litera-
ture on flexible workforces (e.g., Kesavan et al., 2014).
We combine survey data from multiple manufactur-
ing firm informants (operations and human resource
managers) with secondary data on firm financial perfor-
mance. Overall, our results are mixed, presenting sample
opportunities for future work to explore the implications
of precarious working conditions at the individual, com-
pany and societal level.
Specifically, we find an inverted u-shaped relation-
ship between the adoption of precarious work and flexi-
bility and financial performance in the guise of return on
assets; low levels of precarious work improve flexibility
and return on assets and high levels of precarious work
harm both. The relationship between precarious
work and cost performance is linear and negative;
increased adoption of precarious work leads to a reduc-
tion in cost performance. Additionally, we find that
adopting precarious work does not affect a company's
occupational health & safety performance. Finally, com-
panies can shift the turning point between precarious
work and flexibility performance through implementing
HPWP in the form of employee empowerment practices,
but not through skill enhancement. Due to the small
sample size and potential endogeneity concerns, these
results need to be taken and interpreted carefully. Never-
theless, this study is one of the first that provides a com-
prehensive assessment of the performance implications
of adopting precarious work in the OM domain and the
mixed results suggest that firms only benefit from low
levels of adoption of these practices.
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2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The implications of precarious work have been exten-
sively debated and studied outside of the operations
domain (for a review see Kreshpaj et al., 2020). Terminol-
ogy varies across disciplines with precarious conditions
also being deemed contingent employment and nonstan-
dard work (Kreshpaj et al., 2020). However, terms like
contingent and nonstandard can also be applied to work
arrangements that are potentially insecure, but highly
remunerated (e.g., being a self-employed IT consultant).
Hence, most disciplines describe work as precarious,
where nonstandard working arrangements place the
workers and their families at risk. We do the same, both
to engage in the wider discourse outside OM and to be
clear that we are studying forms of work that a great deal
of previous research has already concluded lead to ill
health, stress and insecurity (Campbell & Price, 2016;
Ojala & Pyiöriä, 2019).
Precarious work is conceptualized as a multi-
dimensional construct that captures the job characteris-
tics of employment insecurity, inadequate income, and a
lack of rights and protections (Campbell & Price, 2016;
Kreshpaj et al., 2020). These characteristics result in eco-
nomic and social insecurities, physiological and psycho-
logical stress, and possibly harmful conditions (Berry &
Bell, 2018; Fisher & Connelly, 2017).
Ojala and Pyiöriä (2019) distinguish between subjec-
tive (fears of labor market risk, poor employability pros-
pects and previous unemployment) and objective
(temporary contract, low earnings and low representa-
tion) features when discussing the implications of precar-
ious work. Subjective features relate to individual-level
research and job characteristics, while objective features
are related to company-level research (Petriglieri
et al., 2019). The OM literature has traditionally focused
on nonstandard forms of work, such as temporary con-
tracts, but has not tended to investigate precarious work
in relation to inadequate income and a lack of rights and
protections (Kuruvilla & Li, 2021; Ojala & Pyiöriä, 2019).
This research is conducted at the firm level of analy-
sis. Hence, we operationalize precariousness through
objective forms of work (fixed-term contract workers on
either a full- or part-time basis, self-employed workers
and zero-hour workers1), as well as objective characteris-
tics of the job; specifically, low remuneration and low col-
lective bargaining power (Campbell & Price, 2016;
Kreshpaj et al., 2020; Ojala & Pyiöriä, 2019).
Precariousness is therefore operationalized as a
multidimensional construct with workers who have per-
manent employment, are well paid and have collective
bargaining power being the least precarious and workers
who have temporary employment, are poorly paid and
have no collective bargaining power being the most pre-
carious. For simplicity and clarity, we will refer to the
least precarious jobs as secure work while other arrange-
ments will be referred to as precarious work.
We also explore worker safety as a dependent variable
because safety links what matters to individual workers
with firm performance. Occupational health & safety is
both a characteristic of an individual's job that is related
to precariousness and is increasingly seen as a measure
of operational performance (e.g., Pagell et al., 2015).
2.1 | Performance implications of
precarious work
The use of precarious work represents a sizable portion
of all work arrangements (Eurofound, 2018). These work
arrangements are widely expected to decrease costs and
increase flexibility, which should ultimately benefit the
organization. However, there have been few, if any,
empirical studies of these claims that explore the full
range of potential costs and benefits to using precarious
work (Fisher & Connelly, 2017). Shortening product life
cycles, increasing product variety, fluctuating demand
and heightened requirements for product availability,
have made volume and variety flexibility a source of com-
petitive advantage (Zhang et al., 2003). By adopting pre-
carious work, companies can maximize their flexibility
and shift certain risks such as the cost of accidents and
fluctuation in demand onto the workforce (ILO, 2011). In
addition, these contractual arrangements allow compa-
nies to hire and fire workers as needed with limited
impact on costs. This shifting of operational risks to the
workers is extensively discussed in the press (e.g., The
Guardian, 2020a, 2020b). As far back as 2002,
Kratzer (2002) argued that such a power shift results in
exploitation and precarious job characteristics. These
potential negative implications of precarious work on
workers' health and safety have received little, if any,
attention in the OM discipline.
2.1.1 | Flexibility, cost and financial
performance
Achieving flexibility through resource allocation/man-
agement and operational and supply chain design has
been extensively explored in modeling, analytical and
empirical studies (Aksin et al., 2007; Barz &
Kolisch, 2014; Hopp et al., 2004). From an operations
manager's perspective, an increase in the use of precari-
ous forms of work, such as temporary employees, could
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be valuable in that a flexible workforce can be viewed as
an enabler on which other competitive capabilities are
built (Hallgren & Olhager, 2009). For example, Jack and
Raturi (2002) reported that workforce flexibility is a key
source of volume flexibility, whereas other researchers
pointed towards greater financial success through a
reduction in operational expenses (Valverde et al., 2000).
Precarious forms of work enhance a company's ability to
manage fluctuations in demand (Bonet et al., 2013;
Hallgren & Olhager, 2009; Jack & Raturi, 2002) and turn
some fixed costs into variable costs, by providing a mech-
anism for companies to alter employee numbers and
hours on-demand (Dudbridge, 2011; Valverde
et al., 2000).
The evidence from the OM literature appears to align
with practice; increasing the use of precarious workers is a
cost-effective way to deal with uncertainty through flexibil-
ity. However, the OM literature generally does not exam-
ine how these forms of work might impact precarious and
nonprecarious workers, from a strategic human resource
perspective. Fisher and Connelly (2017) noted that when
all costs and benefits are considered and employers look
beyond immediate savings, precarious workers may repre-
sent a false economy. While direct labor costs are typically
lowered, it is unclear if these initial cost reductions ulti-
mately translate into savings once the overall productivity
and all potential indirect costs are taken into account from
a human capital (HC) perspective (Fisher &
Connelly, 2017; Kalleberg et al., 2000).
HC presents an important organizational resource to
generate value or improve performance (Riley
et al., 2017). HC can be characterized as the “stock of indi-
viduals' knowledge, skills, and abilities in an organisation
to generate an ‘ideal’ composition of employees that creates
value” (Methot & Allen, 2018, p. 723). HC in the form of
knowledge can lead to sustainable competitive advantage
(e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992). It has been repeatedly noted
that an organization's knowledge and capabilities are pre-
dominantly situated in their HC (Mayer et al., 2012). For
example, Hatch and Dyer (2004), identified that HC
selection, development, and deployment improves perfor-
mance. In addition, Crook et al.'s (2011) meta-analysis
found strong positive links between HC and perfor-
mance, especially operational performance.
Many authors note that there are differences between
firm specific and general HC. Firm specific HC refers to
knowledge, skills and abilities that are unique to a firm
(Mayer et al., 2012). Investments in firm specific HC are
tied to the firm and are expected to confer competitive
advantage. The typical explanation for why firm specific
HC creates competitive advantage is based on the
resource-based theory, resting on the premise that truly
unique skills and knowledge are developed over time, are
context dependent, and are only valuable for a company
if aligned with its strategy (e.g., Barney, 1986; Coff, 1997;
Kor & Mahoney, 2005).
General HC refers to HC that all firms in an industry
need or can leverage (e.g., Crook et al., 2011). Invest-
ments in general HC have typically been associated with
benefits to the workers, but not their employer
(e.g., Morris et al., 2017). Investing in general HC does
not build firm specific skills or knowledge and from the
resource-based theory perspective would not confer long-
term competitive advantage. Lepak and Snell (1999) note
that when workers have skills that are easy to acquire or
can be easily replaced, firms will not have an incentive to
invest in them. In other words, precarious workers hired
to reduce costs or provide a response to uncertainty are
unlikely to acquire firm specific skills. Investing in these
workers would be investing in general HC. Hence, firms
are unlikely to make investments in precarious workers
since this would increase costs and only benefit the
workers.
The adoption of precarious work should lower costs,
increase flexibility and ultimately improve firm financial
performance. However, it does not create firm specific
HC (Riley et al., 2017) and firms will not have incentives
to develop these workers. This fits the general patterns
seen in practice, where the adoption of precarious work
is seen as good for the firm, but harmful to workers.
However, from the HC perspective, it seems short-sighted
to solely consider the benefits of adopting precarious
work, without considering the potential downsides.
Working arrangements are reciprocal relationships
between the employer and the employees. Employees
work for companies primarily for the exchange of mone-
tary rewards and other commonly expected work related
social benefits. Akerlof (1982), who viewed labor con-
tracts partially as gift exchanges, highlighted the recipro-
cal nature of the relationship when he noted that wages
are determined and influenced by workers' effort and
that this is partially determined by wages (Akerlof, 1984).
Fehr et al. (1998) built on the notion of gift exchange in
labor markets and concluded that reciprocal behavior
in the labor market is a stable phenomenon (Gino &
Flynn, 2011). Reciprocity is critical because secure work
is used to set the level of expectations for the entire work-
force (both secure and precarious) in terms of monetary
rewards and security, as well as fostering a sense of
belonging among workers towards their organization.
Precarious work does not match with these expectations
and workers may not perform as expected since they are
likely to adjust their behavior to reciprocate for poor
wages and low levels of security (Fehr et al., 1998).
The OM literature does not link decisions to increase
operational flexibility or decrease costs via various forms
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of work to worker outcomes. However, related research
from the OM discipline has concluded that workers who
are at risk, stressed and unhealthy, and whose jobs have
precarious characteristics, do not develop or contribute to
the organization, thus reducing financial performance
(Das et al., 2008; Longoni et al., 2013; Pagell et al., 2014;
Pagell & Gobeli, 2009; Veltri et al., 2013). These conclu-
sions align with studies in the organizational psychology
and safety literature that have researched the “human
costs” of jobs that can be characterized as precarious
(Ashford et al., 2007; Kreiner et al., 2006; Petriglieri
et al., 2019; Piccoli et al., 2017).
In addition, introducing or increasing the adoption
of precarious work, not only affects the workers in these
precarious jobs, but also the secure workers in the com-
pany (Eldor & Cappelli, 2020). According to Kuvaas
et al. (2013), “a ‘blended workforce,’ where standard and
nonstandard workers work together, may negatively affect
the attitudes and behaviors of the standard employees”
(p. 94). Low levels of adoption of precarious work, such
as hiring a few extra temporary workers for a short-term
seasonal demand spike, should not have an impact on
how the secure workforce views and does their jobs.
Thus, the performance outcomes from low levels of
adoption of precarious work should primarily increase
volume flexibility and reduce fixed costs, improving
financial performance (Dudbridge, 2011; Valverde
et al., 2000). However, as the level of adoption of precar-
ious work increases, the likelihood for negative spill-
overs also increases (Davis-Blake et al., 2003). When the
secure workforce notices that management's treatment
of the precarious workers is solely transactional, they
may fear for their own long-term place in the company.
This may affect all workers, as even the secure work-
force worries about their benefits or status within the
company. The secure workers might be afraid that they
will be treated similarly in the future, or even lose their
job, as their role may also be turned into a precarious
position. They may conclude that there is a general stra-
tegic change by management to not invest in HC any-
more. In other words, the workers perceive that
management has altered the terms of the reciprocal
agreement and the secure workers respond in kind. This
response or spillover effect is very similar to the argu-
ments made against outsourcing or downsizing. Cost
driven outsourcing decisions have been shown to reduce
worker motivation and performance. A large-scale study
by Maertz Jr. et al. (2010) identified that survivors of
layoffs, or combinations of outsourcing and layoffs, have
lower perceived organizational performance, lower job
security, lower affective and calculative attachments to
the organization, and higher turnover intentions than a
no layoffs comparison group.
To summarize, the literature on various forms of
work offers conflicting predictions on the outcomes from
adopting precarious practices. On the one hand, precari-
ous work should increase operational flexibility, decrease
costs and improve financial performance. On the other, it
may reduce worker commitment and motivation which
decreases individual motivation and by extension, opera-
tional and firm performance.
We suggest that with an increase in the employment
of precarious workers a stressful workplace environment
is created that can have negative implications for the per-
formance of the existing secure workforce. Adopting pre-
carious work can bring initial gains in terms of cost
savings and matching supply and demand more effec-
tively. However, these need to be considered alongside
the potential longer-term losses in performance, which
are associated with not building or even destroying exis-
ting HC. The implication is that as the degree of precari-
ous work increases, the performance of a firm is also
likely to decrease (Lisi, 2013; Orellana et al., 2019). Sub-
sequently, we propose that there is a diminishing mar-
ginal effect of adopting precarious work on cost,
flexibility and financial performance, with an increas-
ingly negative relationship past the turning point. Thus,
at high levels of precariousness, we expect there to be a
negative impact on a firm's cost, flexibility and financial
performance.
H1(abc). There is a diminishing effect of
adopting precarious work on (a) cost,
(b) flexibility and (c) financial performance,
resulting in a negative relationship past the
turning point (i.e., inverted u-shaped).
2.1.2 | Occupational health and safety
Adopting precarious work could have a strong negative
impact on the workers' psychological and physiological
well-being (Fisher & Connelly, 2017). The negative psy-
chological implications of precarious work have been
extensively discussed in the literature (e.g., Camerman
et al., 2007; De Cuyper & De Witte, 2008; Kraimer
et al., 2005; Nollen & Axel, 1996). Lewchuck (2017) iden-
tified that precarious workers were significantly more
likely to report that their general and mental health was
worse than those in secure employment. Ojala and
Pyiöriä (2019) found that precarious employees had an
increased risk of receiving a disability pension.
In a review of 57 longitudinal studies on the associa-
tion between job insecurity and health and well-being,
De Witte et al. (2016, p. 18) found “clear evidence [for]
exhaustion (burnout), [with regard to] general mental/
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psychological well-being, self-rated health, and a variety of
somatic complaints” caused by job insecurity. In addition
to negative psychological effects, evidence also exists for
increased coronary heart disease (Ferrie et al., 2013),
increased morbidity (Ferrie et al., 2001), as well as high
blood pressure and body mass indices (Ferrie et al., 1998)
amongst precarious workers. In sum, there is empirical
evidence of the negative consequences of precarious work
on workers' psychological well-being and health
(Cheng & Chan, 2008; De Witte et al., 2016).
To our knowledge, the specific link between precari-
ous work and safety has not been tested (Fisher &
Connelly, 2017) and the literature provides conflicting
suggestions as to its direction and strength. Thus, we add
OHS performance as a dependent variable. Workers that
take on precarious work tend to have less training and
experience (Ojala & Pyiöriä, 2019) and accident rates are
higher for employees with less job proficiency
(e.g., Breslin & Smith, 2006). Furthermore, precarious
workers often do repetitive and labor intensive tasks.
Repetition leads to boredom and boredom can lead to
mistakes, which could result in accidents and injuries
(Loukidou et al., 2009). Thus, in addition to the pressure
of being in a precarious situation, the specific working
environment could negatively affect precarious workers
(Danna & Griffin, 1999) in the guise of an increased risk
of accidents. This suggests that increased adoption of pre-
carious work should lead to a decrease in OHS
performance.
On the other hand, simple repetitive tasks might not
require much training or experience and thus the effect
on accidents could be null. In addition, workers in pre-
carious jobs are often only in specific jobs for a short
period of time, which should reduce the likelihood of
boredom leading to accidents. Finally, there is evidence
that because precarious workers are in an atypical con-
tractual relationship, they are less likely to report an
accident (e.g., Probst et al., 2013), which further compli-
cates this issue in that absent worker data results in the
measure of OHS at the organizational level being
attenuated.
Our conceptualization of OHS is at the organizational
level, but the measure does provide an indication of the
workers' perspective in that poor safety is experienced
first and foremost by the workers who are put at risk or
injured. Despite the counterarguments, given the
established link between precarious work and ill health,
and the potential links between precarious work and
safety we propose:
H2. Higher levels of adoption of precarious
work have a negative impact on occupational
health and safety performance.
2.2 | Precarious work and high-
performance work practices
Strategic human resource management research has
identified that HPWP such as formal training, empower-
ment or reduced status differentials between employees
enhance workers' job satisfaction, trust in management,
and organizational commitment (Macky & Boxall, 2007).
Alvesson and Willmott (2002) argue that training and
promotion are a significant source of an individual's iden-
tification with and commitment to an organization. Rai-
neri (2017) identified that training and empowerment
practices lead to the development of HC and result in
higher employee commitment.
The link between HPWP and organizational out-
comes is indirect. Way (2002) found that while HPWP
reduce employee turnover they do not directly impact
productivity. Kehoe and Wright (2013) also propose that
HPWP do not directly affect firm performance. In line
with Macky and Boxall (2007), they identified that the
employees' perceptions of HPWP affects their commit-
ment. HPWP would then directly increase commitment
and motivation and it is through this process that HPWP
indirectly impacts organizational performance.
However, traditional resource-based theory argu-
ments surrounding HC suggest these practices would not
have the same impact with precarious workers since this
would, in essence, be an investment in general HC
(e.g. Lepak & Snell, 1999), which only benefits the
workers. HPWP are generally viewed to be on the oppo-
site end of the continuum in comparison to precarious
work, in terms of human resource management strategies
(Martini et al., 2021).
HPWP can also be viewed as a set of practices that
develops “underdeveloped” HC; in this case precarious
workers. Connelly and Gallagher (2004) concluded that
contingent workers respond positively when employers
invest in them, in terms of attitude, behavior and perfor-
mance. Kuvaas et al. (2013) investigated the implications
of investing in or developing both precarious and secure
employees. They identified that both groups reacted posi-
tively to investment on multiple dimensions such as work
effort, work quality and organizational citizenship behav-
ior. Furthermore, employee empowerment is particularly
important for precarious workers as it provides the vul-
nerable workforce with a sense of value and belonging,
that they would otherwise lack in comparison with the
secure workforce (Kuvaas et al., 2013).
In addition, there is empirical evidence linking invest-
ments in general HC to performance (e.g., Riley
et al., 2017), though a meta-analysis suggests the effect is
smaller than investing in firm specific HC (Crook
et al., 2011). Riley et al. (2017) suggest this occurs because
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investments in general HC signal intent on the part of
the firm, in turn acting as an incentive for workers to
develop new skills and capabilities.
The typical depiction of investments in HC as being
made by the firm overlooks a critical fact, the workers
themselves decide if they are actually going to acquire
new skills, knowledge and abilities. A firm can offer
training; it cannot make workers learn and therefore
needs to provide workers with an incentive to acquire
new skills. Riley et al. (2017) note that investing in gen-
eral HC can be viewed as a signal of the firm's commit-
ment to the workers. In other words, even though
training and empowering precarious workers seems at
odds with minimizing costs and traditional resource-
based theory perspectives of investing in general HC, it
is possible that these investments send a strong signal of
intent, to both the precarious and secure workforce;
with this signal being equally or more important to the
secure workers (Eldor & Cappelli, 2020). A firm that is
increasing its use of precarious workers and is not
investing in the workforce is signaling to the secure
workers that they might also lose their status. Hence,
neither the precarious or secure workforce will be moti-
vated or committed. However, the use of HPWP, espe-
cially when the precarious workers are also involved,
sends a different signal. Specifically, that the firm does
care and is willing to invest in all of its people. From
this perspective investing in general HC, via HPWP,
likely increases the motivation and commitment of both
the secure and precarious workforces, which then leads
to improved performance.
While HPWP cover a wide range of practice bundles,
the use of empowerment and formal training are the
most well-established practices (Gardner et al., 2001;
Subramony, 2009; Sun et al., 2007). Empowerment
enhancing bundles “boost employee autonomy and
responsibility levels” (Subramony, 2009, 745–746). Skill
enhancement bundles are geared towards augmenting
the knowledge and skill levels of the workforce (Sun
et al., 2007). The former shapes individuals' commitment
to the organization through engaging workers in organi-
zational participation, while the latter impacts commit-
ment by showing an appreciation for employees' work
and the need for work performance (Gardner
et al., 2001).
Based on the traditional view of investing in general
HC, HPWP would not moderate the relationship between
precarious work and performance. However, more recent
work shows that these investments have positive implica-
tions for the motivation and commitment of both precari-
ous (e.g., Kuvaas et al., 2013) and secure workers
(e.g., Riley et al., 2017). We propose that managers can
increase the level of precarious work that can be adopted,
before experiencing the negative impacts of precarious
work, by also embracing the empowerment and training
components of HPWP. In other words, by adopting
HPWP, companies can shift the turning point of the
predicted curvilinear relationship between precarious
work and cost, flexibility and financial performance to
the right:
H3(a). Empowerment and skill enhance-
ment moderate the relationship between pre-
carious work and performance, so that
relatively higher levels of precarious work can
be adopted before they negatively affect oper-
ational (cost and flexibility) and financial
performance.
The predicted relationship between precarious work
and OHS in H2 is linear, not curvilinear, Hence, we also
predict:
H3(b). Empowerment and skill enhance-
ment moderate the relationship between pre-
carious work and OHS performance.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates our hypotheses.
Based on the underpinnings of human capital theory
and previous work, we hypothesize that the relationship
between precarious work and performance is curvilinear
(H1(a,b,c)). In terms of managing precarious work, we
propose that companies can potentially shift the turning
point of the curvilinear relationship between precarious
work and performance to the right by adopting HPWP
(H3(a)). With regard to H3(b) we propose that empower-
ment and skill enhancement can reduce the potentially
negative implications of precarious work on OHS
performance.
FIGURE 1 Research model
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3 | METHOD
3.1 | Survey design, sample and data
collection
Our primary method of data collection was through a
survey administrated by a UK-based global market-
research company to multiple respondents per firm. To
increase objectivity and to allow triangulation of our find-
ings we also collected data from secondary sources for
control and dependent variables.
The population is all manufacturing firms (Standard
Industrial Classification [SIC] 10-32) with primary trading
addresses in the UK. The annual accounts of all UK-based
companies (private and public) are available from the
FAME2 database. Firms listed therein were randomly con-
tacted in 2017 to ask for their participation in this study.
We obtained data from two informants per firm, along
with publicly available secondary data on the number of
employees, industrial classification, total assets, net
income and cost of goods sold (COGS). To develop a sec-
ondary measure for occupational health & safety perfor-
mance we followed Pagell et al. (2019) and collected data
from the UK's Health & Safety Executive (HSE) database
which is an open access data source3 that lists health and
safety-related information for all UK companies.
To establish our explanatory and moderating vari-
ables, we first randomly contacted firms from the popula-
tion to solicit the participation of one of their human
resource (HR) managers with senior decision-making
authority (such as policy making and the hiring and fir-
ing of personnel). If the offered informant had no such
senior decision-making authority, we asked for further
referral or excluded the firm from the survey. We
obtained 204 complete responses from the targeted group
of HR managers. We took the referrals of these 204 HR
managers to the person with responsibility for operations
at their company, to retrieve information regarding cost
and flexibility performance. Eventually, a total of
125 firms provided matched information from both HR
and operations managers; of which 111 companies publi-
shed the required data on FAME to calculate the second-
ary data control variables (see Table 1).
To assess whether this sample of 111 companies is
representative of our population, key demographics
between the sample of 111 firms and all 4914
manufacturing firms listed in the FAME database were
compared for the financial year 2017. Potential differ-
ences in industry affiliation were checked by comparing
the first digit of the UK 2007 SIC code (χ2 = 10.792;
p = .374). Next, we compared the reported number of
employees (F = 0.221, p = .638). We also compared the
return on assets (ROA) for the 110 firms in the sample
that reported their ROA (F = 0.197, p = .586). The homo-
geneity of variance assumption was not violated in the
ANOVA tests (p ≥ .368). We conclude that the sample is
not significantly different from the population of UK-
based manufacturing firms listed in FAME, mitigating
selection bias concerns.
The purpose of the project was explained to all partici-
pants who were assured of the confidentiality of their
responses, and that there were no right or wrong answers.
Concerns over common method bias were largely allevi-
ated due to two design approaches. First, information on
the explanatory and dependent variables was retrieved
from different informants (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The
model to test H2 was the only exception. In this model,
HR managers provided both the explanatory and depen-
dent variables all of which were operationally defined
(i.e., nonperceptual). Second, the measures of precarious
work (i.e., temporary contracts, low earnings, employee
representation) are nonperceptual (Chang et al., 2010).
3.2 | Measures
The HR respondents provided the responses to the items
used to create the explanatory and moderating measures
TABLE 1 Sample demographics:
Number of employees and SIC code
Number of employees 2017 Count SIC Count SIC (cont.) Count (cont.)
<10 1 10 9 24 3
11–50 42 11 2 25 12
51–250 61 13 2 26 8
251–500 5 14 1 27 5
>501 2 16 3 28 13
17 4 29 8
18 7 31 3
20 10 32 12
23 7 33 1
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of precarious work, skill enhancing bundles, empower-
ment enhancing bundles and the occupational health &
safety metrics of the firm's operational workers. The
operations managers assessed our dependent variables of
cost and flexibility performance. Please note, the opera-
tions managers also respond to the items that addressed
precarious work. Their responses where used to check for
endogeneity. The HR respondents' assessment of precari-
ous work was used in the main analysis, given they likely
knew the most about employees' contractual status.
Appendix A depicts all of the survey measures. Secondary
data from FAME was used to measure the firm's financial
performance (ROA) and to calculate the control variables
of dynamism, munificence, competitive intensity and
firm size. Additional secondary data was collected from
the UK HSE to triangulate our results regarding hypothe-
sis two (OHS performance).
Precarious work was operationalized as an additive
composite measure with three standardized and equally
weighted dimensions (temporary contracts to proxy
employment insecurity, low earnings to proxy inadequate
income, and employee representation to proxy a lack of
rights) based on Campbell and Price (2016), Ojala and
Pyiöriä (2019) and Kreshpaj et al. (2020). While the litera-
ture agrees on the multidimensional nature of the con-
struct; previous research has generally assessed
precariousness from the standpoint of individual workers
(e.g., Campbell & Price, 2016). Research at the firm level
of analysis using managerial respondents to address all
three dimensions of precarious work is lacking. While
our research is generally of a confirmatory nature, the
development of a composite measure for precarious work
is one of the contributions of our research to the
literature.
Respondents were asked to report average values on
each of the precarious work dimensions for the preceding
12 months. Temporary contracts were assessed as the
summed percentage of temporary workers, in terms of
zero-hour contract workers, fixed-term workers, and self-
employed workers relative to the firm's total employees
(Chadwick & Flinchbaugh, 2016). Values of this stan-
dardized dimension range from 0.39 to 7.14. In line
with prior literature, temporary workers supplied
through a staffing agency were excluded from our proxy
for employment insecurity as their contracts are with the
agency (i.e., outsourced employment) and not the firm of
interest (Chadwick & Flinchbaugh, 2016; Jokela, 2017;
Petriglieri et al., 2019). Prior research operationalized low
earnings as a binary variable, with workers whose pay
was at or below a set threshold deemed as having low
earnings (Kreshpaj et al., 2020). Therefore, we
operationalize low earnings as a binary variable, with
workers receiving the minimum wage (or below) deemed
low earnings. Specifically, low earnings4 were assessed as
the weighted sum of binary variables for each employ-
ment category (permanent, fixed-term, zero hours,
agency and self-employed), checking whether the major-
ity of operational workers in the employment category
are paid above the minimum wage and weighted for the
employment category's representation in the firm's total
employment. Values of this standardized dimension
range from 1.97 to 3.99. Employee representation was
measured as the share of permanent and fixed-term
employees organized in trade-unions. We then weighted
this share for the representation of permanent and fixed-
term employees amongst the firm's total employees. This
factor was then multiplied by 1, so that, in line with the
other two dimensions, a higher score means less repre-
sentation/more precarious employment among the oper-
ational workers. Values of this standardized dimension
range from 4.52 to 0.41. It is important to note the
values for temporary contracts, low earning, and
employee representation fall outside the expected range
of standardization (±3), as they are not normally
distributed.
In summary, precarious work consists of three
dimensions, each dimension was first standardized and
then summed. As a result, a firm's precarious work
score needs to be interpreted relative to the other firms
in the sample. Figure 2a (cost performance) and
Figure 2b (flexibility performance) highlight that precar-
ious work is a multidimensional composite consisting of
temporary contracts, earnings, and employee represen-
tation; a high degree of precarious work is a combina-
tion of a high share of temporary contracts, low
earnings, and poor employee representation within a
firm. In addition, the figure illustrates the distribution
of precarious working practices across firms in our sam-
ple. For ease of interpretation, each datapoint was color-
coded to indicate performance with respect to cost
(Figure 2a) and flexibility (Figure 2b). Red coloring indi-
cates best performance and cyan coloring indicates
poorest performance.
Operational cost and flexibility performance were con-
ceptualized using the measures reported in Ward and
Duray (2000) and Wiengarten et al. (2014). All items were
measured on a seven-point Likert scale and summed to
assess the company's performance in relation to the firm's
major competitors (Cronbach's α: cost performance
α = .769; flexibility performance α = .540). The FAME
database does not contain any readily accessible second-
ary measures for flexibility that incorporate the com-
monly considered dimensions of output volume, product
mix, throughput time and new product introduction.
Therefore, flexibility was only addressed using the survey
measures.
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Financial performance was conceptualized through
ROA which was calculated as a firm's operating income
divided by total assets in the respective year (Eroglu &
Hofer, 2014; Kovach et al., 2015). From an OM perspec-
tive ROA can be interpreted as a proxy for the profitabil-
ity of a firm and the efficiency of asset utilization
(Kovach et al., 2015). We obtained ROA data for the years
2014–2017 for 110 firms. No single extreme values were
detected by visual inspection.
Occupational health and safety (OHS) was measured
by two items reporting the number of occupational acci-
dents and days of missed work resulting from occupa-
tional injury or illness amongst operational workers at
the company in the last 12 months. The primary informa-
tion on OHS was collected through the survey (additional
secondary data was collected for triangulation purposes).
Each item was weighted for the firm's total number of
operational workers (Pagell et al., 2015) and standard-
ized. The summed composite measure was multiplied by
1 so that lower values indicate worse OHS
performance.
The skill enhancing measure was conceptualized
through four items on a seven-point Likert scale measur-
ing a company's efforts to augment the knowledge and
skill levels of its workforce in terms of training programs
(Sun et al., 2007). Responses were collected and weighted
for the relative representation of each employment cate-
gory (permanent worker, fixed-term worker, agency
worker, self-employed, zero-hour contract) in the firm
(Cronbach's α = .762). The empowerment enhancing
measure was also conceptualized through four items
measuring a firm's practices to increase its employee's
autonomy and responsibility levels (Subramony, 2009).
Again, the responses were collected and weighted for
each employment category relative to total employment
(Cronbach's α = .850).
We included multiple control variables to specify the
relationship between precarious work and operational
performance given other potentially important influ-
ences. For each firm we included the number of
manufacturing sites, as all things being equal, more sites
imply more complexity, which might affect company per-
formance (Lu & Shang, 2017) and the need for flexible
labor. Firm size was controlled for using the log trans-
formed number of employees as reported in the FAME
database in 2017. Firm size may be related to whether
employees are organized in unions as well as to firm per-
formance (Machin, 1991). Next, we included a dummy
variable to indicate whether a firm is Investors In People
(IIP) certified. IIP aims to help UK organizations improve
the way they manage, develop and inspire their work-
force, on the premise that focusing on skills training is
















FIGURE 2 (a) Precarious work composites and sample spread
(N = 111)—cost performance is represented by different colors,
with red indicating best performance and cyan indicating poorest
performance. Small colored circles within the cuboid indicate data
points; small black circles on the edges span the surface of the
cuboid, representing min and max values of the respective
dimension. (b) Precarious work composites and sample spread
(N = 111)—flexibility performance is represented by different
colors, with red indicating best performance and cyan indicating
poorest performance. Small colored circles within the cuboid
indicate data points; small black circles on the edges span the
surface of the cuboid, representing min and max values of the
respective dimension
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IIP certification is held by over 14,000 organizations
across 75 countries, with over 90% of these firms being in
the UK (Waal, 2016). Being certified can boost
organizational reputation and performance (Rose &
Thomsen, 2004) and may be related to both the adoption
of precarious work or the use of HPWP.
Finally, to account for industry level factors that
might influence the use of precarious work or firm per-
formance, we followed previous literature and included
competition, dynamism and munificence (Dess &
Beard, 1984). In industries which are more concentrated/
have more competition we would expect more cost pres-
sure and increased use of precarious workers while in
industries which were munificent, we would expect the
opposite. Dynamism would instead likely be related to
the need for flexibility, with higher levels of dynamism
being associated with increased flexibility needs and
more precarious work. Competition was operationalized
as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is
defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of
the firms within each industry sector in 2017 (we used
UK 2007 four-digit SIC codes to define industry sectors).
Increases in the HHI indicate a decrease in competition.
Following Dess and Beard (1984), dynamism was
operationalized by dividing the standard error of the
regression slope coefficient of time against industry sector
sales for the 5-year period (2013–2017) by the mean value
of industry sales. Munificence was operationalized as
industry sector sales growth over the 5-year period.
3.3 | Psychometric properties of multi-
item scales
The psychometric properties for the moderating variables
of empowerment and skill enhancing bundles were eval-
uated by conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
for the items of these two constructs to test convergent
validity using AMOS 25. Each item was assessed by HR
managers for all employment categories (permanent,
fixed-term, zero hours, agency and self-employed). We
conducted the CFA on the responses for permanent
employees, as every company in our sample employs per-
manent employees, while not every company employs
the other categories of operational workers. The CFA
failed the initial χ2-test (p = .017). Thus, we conducted
Bollen-Stine's nonparametric bootstrapping with
500 bootstrap samples using AMOS 25 (Bollen &
Stine, 1992). Testing the null hypothesis that the model is
correct, we obtained a p-value of .100. Given this test
result, we felt more comfortable interpreting the obtained
approximate fit indices (McIntosh, 2007): χ2 = 36,680; χ2/
df = 1.981; CFI = 0.954; GFI = 0.934; RMSEA = 0.094;
SRMR = 0.0705; PClose = 0.063; IFI = 0.956. The indices
indicate tolerable fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) given the
sample size (Marsh et al., 1988), demonstrating some evi-
dence of convergent validity.
We examined discriminant validity estimating the
Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio for both constructs, as
suggested in Henseler et al. (2014). The calculated score
was 0.52 and thus well below the 0.85 cut-off, further
supporting the assumption of unrelated construct measure-
ments. In addition, the squared term of the correlation
between the two constructs was lower than their average
variance extracted (AVE). AVE was 0.593 for empower-
ment enhancing bundles and 0.679 for skill enhancing
bundles. Given the relatively small variation in loadings we
used Cronbach's α to assess reliability which was: α = .762
for the empowerment enhancing bundles and α = .850 for
the skill enhancing bundles. Hence, we concluded that our
moderation measures possess adequate reliability.
The obtained factor loadings were then used to create
the two constructs across all employment categories of
the firm. The assessment of the items per employment
category was weighted relative to total employment.
Table 2 reports the means, min/max, standard devia-
tions, and correlations of the studied variables in the
sample firms. Correlations indicate that the ordinary
least squares (OLS) assumption of no perfect collinearity
is not violated.
Because the indicators of operational performance
were responded to by the operations managers, and in line
with prior literature that has treated the dimensions of
operational performance as latent formative constructs
(Ahmad & Schroeder, 2003; Samson & Terziovski, 1999), a
separate CFA was conducted on the performance con-
structs of costs (α = .769) and flexibility (α = .540). The
results, which are consistent with previous research using
these indicators, are χ2 = 22,318; χ2/df = 1.313;
CFI = 0.975; GFI = 0.954; RMSEA = 0.0538;
SRMR = 0.048; PClose = 0.422; IFI = 0.976; p = .173.
However, the individual indicators for each dimension
contain different content (see Appendix A). Thus, the indi-
cators give rise to operational performance, as changes in
the indicators will cause changes in the constructs. There-
fore, each of the operational performance dimensions was
constructed by summing their indicators.
4 | RESULTS
We conducted hierarchical regression and moderated
hierarchical regression for each dependent variable, esti-
mating our regression parameters by OLS. We used the
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistic, for all estimations to
address concerns of heteroskedasticity of arbitrary and
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unknown forms. The average variance inflation factor
(VIF) of the variables is 2.23. The maximum VIF is 4.51.
Thus, increased variance of the estimated regression coef-
ficients due to multicollinearity should not be a serious
concern. We assessed the power of our models post-hoc
to our estimations, using the G*Power 3.1 software. Based
on the smallest effect size determined across the
unrestricted regression models (f2 = 0.259; f2 was esti-
mated by G*Power as a function of the partial correla-
tions squared) our results indicated a power above 0.8.
4.1 | Effects of precarious work on
performance
Tables 3–5 display the results of the regression analyses
for cost, flexibility and financial performance (H1(a,b,c)).
Model 1 represents the restricted model and includes the
control variables. We added the standardized term of pre-
carious work into model 2 and its squared term into
model 3. In model 4, we add the standardized modera-
tors, before the interaction terms between the standard-
ized moderators and the standardized linear terms of
precarious work are added in model 5.
A significant negative effect could be determined
between precarious work and cost performance
(β = .088, t = 2.43, model 2), however, the quadratic
term was insignificant. In addition, the average marginal
effects in model 5 were also insignificant at p = .086.
Hence, instead of the curvilinear relationship predicted,
we find a negative linear relationship indicating that as
precarious work increases, cost performance decreases
(i.e., costs increase). As a robustness check we developed
an additional cost measure based on cost of goods sold
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables
Mean Min Max SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Cost performance 4.86 2.75 7 0.86
2 Flexibility Performance 5.36 3.5 7 0.81 0.573**
3 Occupational Health & Safety 0.001 13.66 0.58 1.58 0.001 0.137
4 ROA 2017 0.08 0.64 0.96 0.19 0.332** 0.214 0.108
5 Precarious work 0.02 5.22 11.29 2.05 0.167 0.022 0.071 0.275*
6 Empowerment 4.46 1.52 7 1.38 0.039 0.066 0.016 0.033 0.006*
7 Skill enhancement 5.10 1.15 7 1.41 0.198* 0.188* 0.090 0.196 0.045 0.495**
8 # of manufacturing sites 1.62 1 18 2.09 0.035 0.156 0.009 0.020 0.004 0.104
9 Firm size 3.92 1.61 6.68 127.78 0.048 0.190* 0.291** 0.185 0.277** 0.060
10 Recognized for IIP 0.09 0 1 0.29 0.124 0.095 0.196 0.142 0.141 0.166
11 HHI 0.09 0.01 0.45 0.09 0.095 0.030 0.050 0.251* 0.021 0.072
12 Dynamism 0.05 0.00 0.40 0.07 0.007 0.059 0.030 0.202 0.092 0.018
13 Munificence 0.24 0.73 2.86 0.44 0.176 0.102 0.025 0.077 0.020 0.051
14 ROA 2016 0.06 0.97 1.12 0.18 0.115 0.077 0.023 0.628** 0.082 0.030
15 ROA 2015 0.06 1.29 1.19 0.19 0.220* 0.145 0.014 0.791** 0.136 0.079
16 ROA 2014 0.05 1.17 1.71 0.22 0.110 0.013 0.089 0.349** 0.175 0.113
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
8 # of manufacturing sites 0.009
9 Firm size 0.009 0.154
10 Recognized for IIP 0.189* 0.072 0.222*
11 HHI 0.047 0.033 0.170 0.034
12 Dynamism 0.027 0.056 0.059 0.164 0.460**
13 Munificence 0.023 0.048 0.060 0.048 0.331** 0.324**
14 ROA 2016 0.082 0.043 0.009 0.025 0.114 0.076 0.032
15 ROA 2015 0.098 0.016 0.044 0.108 0.130 0.124 0.008 0.646**
16 ROA 2014 0.019 0.138 0.001 0.088 0.042 0.005 0.066 0.241* 0.464**
*Significance at .05 level.
**Significance at .01 level.
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(COGS) with data collected from the FAME database.
The estimates of interest when using this indicator of
costs are nonsignificant (see Appendix B for more
detail).
Next, the results show a positive effect of precarious
work (β = .106, t = 2.06, model 5) and a negative effect
of the quadratic term of precarious work (β = .025,
t = 4.15, model 5) on flexibility performance. This indi-
cates a diminishing marginal effect of precarious work on
flexibility performance. To further establish the suspected
inverted u-shaped relationship between precarious work
and flexibility performance, we followed Lind and
Mehlum (2010). First, we found that the observed esti-
mate for the quadratic term is significant and of the
expected sign. Second, we estimated the turning point at
2.12 and found it to be located well within the data range
of mean centered precarious work [5.23; 11.29]. We
then tested this condition by estimating the 95% Fieller
interval for extreme points (Fieller, 1954). The interval
was estimated at [0.46; 3.00] with significant test results
for the presence of an inverted u-shape (p = .002). To
offer additional insight into how the estimated turning
point relates to earnings, employee representation, and
temporary contracts, we selected two companies from the
sample that are closest to the identified turning point.
See company IDs 1010110323 and 1010110405 in
Appendix H, and their specific combinations of the
dimensions of precarious work. For the two companies
closest to the turning point, we observe that they both
pay above the minimum wage with no workers in a
TABLE 3 Regression precarious work and cost performance (N = 111)
Variables
Cost performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)


















































































Empowerment  precarious work .054
(0.042)
Skill enhancement  precarious work .062
(0.061)
Intercept 4.959** 5. 243** 5.184** 5.172** 5.272**
R2 0.066 0.105 0.112 0.139 0.153
ΔR2 0.066 0.039* 0.007 0.027 0.014
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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trade-union and have a turning point which is between
19 and 33% temporary workers.
Thus, we conclude that increasing precarious work
has a larger effect on flexibility performance when
starting with low values of precarious work than with
higher values. Beyond the turning point, precarious work
decreases flexibility performance.
We also conducted a robustness check for the func-
tional form of the relationship between precarious work
and flexibility. Following Haans et al. (2016), we included
a cubic term of precarious work to test whether the rela-
tionship between precarious work and flexibility perfor-
mance is perhaps S-shaped rather than inverted u-
shaped. We find that the cubic term does not improve
model fit. R2quadratic ¼ 0:223; R2cubic ¼ 0:224; change in
R2 = 0.001 (p = .779). This result provides additional sup-
port for the quadratic relationship.
These results provide support for H1(b) with respect to
operational flexibility, but not with respect to cost perfor-
mance (H1(a)), which is linear and negative rather than
curvilinear (Figure 3).
In H1(c) we explored the relationship between the
adoption of precarious work and ROA, since ROA would
capture the efficiency of the firm. ROA 2017 (the year of
the survey data collection) and cost performance are cor-
related at 0.332 which suggests that they are capturing
overlapping but not identical elements of being efficient.
The equation used to test ROA 2017 as the explained
variable is identical to the flexibility and cost perfor-
mance equations. In addition, we included lagged
TABLE 4 Regression precarious work and flexibility performance (N = 111)
Variables
Flexibility performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)


















































































Empowerment  precarious work .123**
(0.038)
Skill enhancement  precarious work .134*
(0.058)
Intercept 6.122** 6.257** 6.147** 6.131** 6.343**
R2 0.078 0.088 0.117 0.146 0.223
ΔR2 0.078 0.010 0.029* 0.029 0.077**
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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variables of ROA accounting for 2014–2016, the 3 years
prior to the survey. In doing so, we can account for fac-
tors unobserved to us that affect ROA, helping to get a
better estimate of the effect of precarious work on ROA
in the same year. ROA data over four consecutive years
could be obtained from 110 firms in the sample. The
results are reported in Table 5.
With regard to model 5, the results support H1(c),
indicating a negative effect of the quadratic term of
precarious work (β = .003, t- = 2.84) on ROA 2017.
The turning point of the inverted u-shaped relationship is
at precarious work equal to 0 and located within the data
range of mean-centered precarious work [5.23; 11.29]
(see Figure 4). Yet the 95% Fieller interval for extreme
points is [12.18; 0.60] which does not allow us to reject
the assumption of a monotone relationship (p = .145)
between precarious work and a firm's same year ROA.
Lastly, we also explored a potential lagged effect of
TABLE 5 Regression precarious work and ROA 2017 (N = 110)
Variables
ROA 2017
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

















































































































Empowerment  precarious work .021
(0.008)
Skill enhancement  precarious work .012**
(0.004)
Intercept 0.130* 0.171** 0.164** 0.165** 0.178**
R2 0.624 0.658 0.668 0.668 0.710
ΔR2 0.624** 0.034 0.010 0.000 0.042**
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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precarious work on ROA by using ROA 2018 data as the
dependent variable with lagged values from 2014 to 2017
as controls. No significant relationship was discovered.
We again selected companies from our sample that were
close to the identified turning point, to offer insight on
their combinations of earnings, employee representation,
and temporary contracts. See company IDs 1010112265
and 1010110407 in Appendix H with mean-centered pre-
carious work values close to 0. For the two companies
closest to the turning point, we observe that they both
pay above minimum wage with no workers in trade-
unions, while both have 3% temporary workers.
Following Haans et al. (2016), we again included a
cubic term of precarious work in model 5 to test for the
presence of an S-shaped relationship with ROA. The cubic
term did not improve model fit. R2quadratic ¼ 0:610;
R2cubic ¼ 0:711; change in R2 = .001 (p = .418).
Table 6 displays the results for occupational health &
safety performance (H2). Model 1 represents the
restricted model with controls. The standardized term of
precarious work was added into model 2. H2 predicted
linear effects so there are no squared terms in these
models. Model 3 includes the standardized moderators,
and model 4 the interaction effects. The results provide
no support for H2.
In order to triangulate the results for H2, we also
explored companies that received a notice or had been
found in breach of the HSE's safety rules. Breaches are
extremely rare; to be found in breach means the violation
was considered serious enough for the HSE to pursue
criminal prosecution of the firm and its management,
and for the courts to have found the firm in breach. Pros-
ecution is the least used of the HSE's tools (HSE, 2017).
Notices, which are much more common, are divided into
improvement and prohibition notices, with the latter
being more severe. Companies issued an improvement
notice have at least 21 days to make the changes required
to be in compliance, while firms who are issued a prohi-
bition notice must make improvements prior to
reopening (HSE, 2017). In line with previous research
which indicates that while accidents are relatively com-
mon, breaches and notices are rare (e.g., Pagell
et al., 2019), only a small sub-set of firms in our sample
were listed in the HSE database. Specifically, we identi-
fied four improvement notices (and no prohibition
notices) and three breaches between 2014 and 2020 in
our sample of firms. No firm received a notice or
breached twice; seven firms in the sample had violated
HSE regulations. Given the small subsample, we were
limited in the analysis we could do and have to interpret
the following with caution. Companies that received a
notice or were found in breach had relatively higher
levels of precarious work (mean value of 3.2) in compari-
son to companies that did not receive a notice or
breached (mean value of 0.236) with a marginal level of
significance at p = .072. These results suggest that our
survey results may have been overly positive and that
with a larger sample we could have observed the
predicted negative relationship between precarious work
and safety.
4.2 | Moderating effects of high-
performance work practices
We next tested the potential moderating roles of empow-
erment and skill enhancement on operational and finan-
cial performance (H3(a)), and on OHS performance
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FIGURE 3 Estimated relationship between flexibility
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We find no significant moderating effect of high-
performance work practices on the relationship between
precarious work and cost performance (Table 4). With
regard to flexibility performance (Table 4), we find a sig-
nificant interaction between both the linear term of pre-
carious work and empowerment (β = .123, t = 3.22,
model 5) and precarious work and skill enhancement
(β = .134 t-2.34, model 5). We conclude that for each
value of the moderators a unique turning point exists.
The obtained estimates indicate that the derivative of the
equation in model 5 of flexibility performance, in terms
of empowerment, is strictly greater than zero. This sug-
gests that as empowerment increases, the turning point
moves to the right (Figure 5). For skill enhancement, we
find an opposing relationship, suggesting that as skill
enhancement increases, the turning point moves to the
left (Figure 6). The results provide support for H3(a) with
respect to flexibility performance and empowerment and
reject H3(a) with respect to skill enhancement.
Next, we find an analogous significant relationship
between the interaction term of precarious work and skill
enhancement on ROA 2017 (β = .013 t = 2.19,
Table 5, model 5) (Figure 7), with no effect regarding
empowerment. Lastly, we find no significant interaction
effect on OHS (Table 6).
Finally, given the small sample size and to aid future
research on the subject, particularly with regards to func-
tional forms, we graph the nonparametric relationships
of our raw data using binned scatter plots in Appendix G
(Starr & Goldfarb, 2020).
4.3 | Robustness checks on the
precarious work composite
In our precarious work composite, we excluded employ-
ment via an agency in measuring the temporary work
dimension since such employment may significantly
TABLE 6 Regression precarious
work and occupational health &
safety (N = 111)
Variables
Occupational health & safety performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)






























































Empowerment  precarious work .093
(0.094)
Skill enhancement  precarious work .054
(0.072)
Intercept 2.488 2.477 2.456 2.600
R2 0.130 0.1130 0.143 0.155
ΔR2 0.130 0.000 0.013 0.012
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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reduce job insecurity vis-à-vis other nonpermanent forms
of employment (Bowman & Cole, 2014). However, given
that agency workers made up the majority of all non-
permanent employees within our sample, for robustness,
we re-estimated the key models using three different
specifications of the composite and controls: (1) including
agency workers in the temporary work dimension, as
well as in the dimensions of wage and representation
(Appendix E); 2) excluding agency workers from all three
measures (temporary work, wages, and representation)
(Appendix E); and (3) adding a control variable for the
share of agency workers (Appendix F). We then com-
pared the obtained estimates to what was estimated in
the main analyses which excluded agency workers in the
temporary work dimension, but included them in the
dimension of wages and representation. The results
remain qualitatively similar.
Because precarious work is a multidimensional con-
struct, we also explored whether the use of this composite
imposed overly strict constraints in our estimations
(Edwards & Parry, 1993). The Edwards and Parry test is
very similar to the assumption that if splitting up the
dimensions explains more variance than the composite, it
may be more reasonable to interpret the effect of each
dimension individually. The differences in R-square
values between the constrained and unconstrained equa-
tions using an F-test indicate no significant difference
from zero, providing some support for the use of a com-
posite. More details regarding the Edwards and Parry test
are reported in Appendix C.
Additional insight might be found in exploring the
individual effects of each precarious work dimension.
Thus, we re-ran our models using the individual dimen-
sions of precarious work (instead of the composite) in
terms of low earnings, employee representation, and tem-
porary contracts on performance. These results are
reported in Appendix D. Based on the R-square values
and significance levels, the individual dimensions explain
a similar degree of variance in our data relative to the
composite scores. Given that theory is clear on precarious
work being a multidimensional construct, we feel the use
of the composite results are most appropriate to discuss
the implications of our results. We will, however, draw
on some of the results for the individual dimensions to
shed light on the nonsignificant and unexpected results.
5 | ENDOGENEITY
Three mechanisms could cause endogeneity concerns in
the present analysis. First, company performance and
precarious work might be correlated because a common
antecedent produces spurious correlation. For example,





















FIGURE 5 Two-way interaction effect between precarious




















FIGURE 6 Two-way interaction effect
between precarious work and skill-
enhancement
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work and show higher performance. More generally, pre-
carious work might be correlated with unmodeled causes
of performance creating omitted variable problems. For
example, precarious work might depend on a firm's social
sustainability focus (as expressed by its certification
choice), which is also likely to have a direct effect on
company performance. To partly address these concerns,
we included several controls that are potentially corre-
lated to both performance and precarious work. The liter-
ature suggests these controls are the most important.
Hence, while one could certainly add additional controls,
we were limited by the sample size. Second, precarious
work and performance may have a reciprocal causal rela-
tionship (simultaneity). While we could not test for this,
we believe that it is reasonable to assume that working
arrangements are chosen in response to desired same-
year performance outcomes and not vice versa. Third, to
test for endogeneity that arises from measurement errors
in precarious work—for example, through the use of sur-
vey measures and proxies—we used instrumental vari-
able estimation (Lu et al., 2018).
Instrumental variable estimation required the identi-
fication of at least two instruments (Haans et al., 2016)
that are uncorrelated with the disturbance term (instru-
ment validity) and correlated with precarious work as
well as with the quadratic term of precarious work
(instrument relevance). Building on the idea of “model
implied instrument variables,” as proposed by
Bollen (2018), we assessed our dataset to find potential
candidate variables that are correlated with precarious
work and uncorrelated with the equation's disturbance
term. We found such a candidate in the assessment of
precarious work made by operations managers. Our pri-
mary analysis uses the assessment of the HR managers
who should be the best informants (e.g., Flynn
et al., 2018). If we can assume that it is precarious work
that affects operational performance, we can assume fur-
ther that the observation of precarious work as obtained
from the operations managers (precarious work*) is
uncorrelated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2016). The
same would hold for the squared term of precarious
work*, which can be instrumented by (precarious
work*)2. Yet, for precarious work* to be a suitable candi-
date, we would also need to assume that measurement
errors in both observations (HR and operations man-
agers) are due to the different vantage points of the infor-
















FIGURE 7 Two-way interaction effect between precarious
work and skill-enhancement
TABLE 7 Tests for endogeneity
Dependent variable Test Results
Suspected endogenous variables: Precarious work and precarious work2 as assessed by the human resource manager
Instruments: Precarious work* and precarious work*2 as assessed by the operations manager
Cost performance
Durbin–Wu–Hausman p = .427 H0 = The suspected endogenous variables are
exogenousDavidson–MacKinnon p = .677
Flexibility performance
Durbin–Wu–Hausman p = .919 H0 = The suspected endogenous variables are
exogenousDavidson–MacKinnon p = .654
Occupational health & safety performance
Durbin–Wu–Hausman p = .635 H0 = The suspected endogenous variables are
exogenousDavidson–MacKinnon p = .471
ROA 2017
Durbin–Wu–Hausman p = .983 H0 = The suspected endogenous variables are
exogenousDavidson–MacKinnon p = .875
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regarding precarious work. To investigate this assump-
tion further, we estimated the absolute deviations of both
assessments within each firm and explored the correla-
tion of this estimate with firm size. It seems reasonable to
assume that HR and operations managers in smaller
firms meet more often than in bigger firms, which may
correlate their biases about precarious work. We tested
this assumption by correlating firm size, average tenure
of responding HR and operations managers as well as the
number of production sites with the observed differences
in assessments of precarious work and found no signifi-
cant estimates (p = .497–.903). Hence, we find support
for the assumption that both measurement errors are
uncorrelated. These results provide some suggestive evi-
dence for the validity of our instruments.
We next conducted multiple tests to explore whether
our instruments are weak (Andrews et al., 2019). 2SLS
estimators are biased towards the OLS estimator, and
inferences based on the standard errors can be severely
misleading if the proposed instruments are only weakly
correlated with the endogenous regressors (Miller
et al., 2020). Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest that the F-
statistic for one endogenous variable, as is the case in our
linear estimations, should exceed 10 to indicate a strong
instrument. The test statistics in our estimations exceed
41.18. Cragg and Donald (1993) and Stock and
Yogo (2005) both further suggest that the F-statistic for
two instruments should exceed 11 for inferences based
on the 2SLS estimator to be reliable. The test statistics in
our quadratic estimations exceed 16.38. Additionally,
accepting at most a rejection rate of 10% of a nominal 5%
Wald test, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are weak in our linear estimation, as the test
statistic of 24.94 exceeds its critical value of 16.38. For
our curvilinear estimations, the result is 16.38 and
exceeds the critical value of 7.03.
As we found no evidence for weak instruments, we
next used the respective instruments to conduct 2SLS
estimations with the dependent variables. Post-estimation
results on the tests for endogeneity of precarious work
and its quadratic in the respective equations are reported
in Table 7, separately for each dependent variable.
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for each equation
indicates that precarious work is exogenous in all
instances. To triangulate the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test,
we also conduct the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)
augmented regression test. These test results further sup-
port the assumption of randomness in the measurement
errors in precarious work and its quadratic term.
Based on the test results, we decided to apply OLS for
estimating the parameters in our models
(Antonakis, 2017). 2SLS estimation is generally less effi-
cient than OLS when the explanatory variables are
approximately exogenous, as 2SLS can have very large
standard errors, because the standard error of beta is the
square root of the estimated asymptotic variance
(Wooldridge, 2016). Lastly, we were unable to retrieve
strong and valid instruments for HPWP, which is a limi-
tation of this study.
6 | DISCUSSION
The research set out to answer two broad questions. First:
How does the use of precarious work affect a company's
operational, financial and occupational health & safety
performance? We identified an inverted u-shaped rela-
tionship between the adoption of precarious work and
flexibility performance; low levels of precarious work
improve flexibility performance and high levels of precar-
ious work harm flexibility. The same relationship was
found between precarious work and financial perfor-
mance in the guise of ROA. The relationship between
precarious work and operational cost performance
appears to be negative and the relationship between pre-
carious work and a company's OHS performance is non-
significant. The results indicate that any benefits to the
firm come at low levels of adoption of precarious working
arrangements.
The second research question was: Does the use of
high-performance work practices moderate the relationship
between precarious work and a company's operational,
financial and occupational health & safety performance?
The results for cost and ROA are insignificant while the
results for flexibility are mixed and suggest a complex
relationship that needs further study. Specifically, for
flexibility performance we find a significant interaction
effect between both the linear term of precarious work
and empowerment: as empowerment increases, the turn-
ing point moves to the right; as skill enhancement
increases, the turning point moves to the left. The right-
ward shift for empowerment was predicted, but the left-
ward shift for skill enhancement was not.
The overall results suggest that precarious work only
delivers the expected benefits to the firm when its adop-
tion is at fairly low levels and that if HPWP have a role to
play in mitigating the negative impacts of precarious work,
this role is complicated and likely limited. The following
sections detail these implications and explicate some of
the questions that future research should address.
6.1 | Managerial implications
Adopting precarious work is expected to lead to increased
flexibility, reduced costs and shifts some risks from the
20 WIENGARTEN ET AL.
firm to the workers (e.g., ILO, 2011; Kesavan et al., 2014).
In the OM literature, the potential downsides from these
working arrangements have generally not been explored
and when they are considered it is typically from the
firm's perspective. The only in depth empirical study in
operations (Kesavan et al., 2014) was based on a service
setting with multiple stores owned by a single retailer.
Kesavan et al. (2014) conclude that there is a curvilinear
relationship between performance and the adoption of
part-time and temporary workers in this specific firm
(our precarious work construct does not include part-
time workers with a permanent contract). However, the
authors generally view the adoption of precarious work
as a “good thing” and their results indicate that in their
specific service setting, the optimal levels of temporary
and part-time workers are 13.48% and 44.03% respec-
tively. A manager looking for guidance from the anec-
dotal, modeling and limited empirical evidence from OM
would likely conclude that while there can be
diminishing returns at very high levels of precarious
work, precarious work is generally good for the firm.
The results suggest otherwise, we find that adopting
precarious work is only beneficial in terms of flexibility
to a certain extent. After a turning point precarious work
harms flexibility performance. Having a small portion of
the workforce in precarious jobs to increase flexibility
would align with our results; but this proportion is lim-
ited, and the current practice of ever-increasing precari-
ous workers would not align with this goal. The scores
on the mean-centered composite measure range from
5.22 to 11.29 and the maximum flexibility performance
(the turning point) in our study occurs when precarious
work equals 2.12. Considering that this is a
nonstandardized Likert scale, this is a relatively low
value in terms of the optimal level of precariousness with
regards to maximizing flexibility performance.
ROA is even more sensitive to higher degrees of pre-
carious work than flexibility, with the maximum ROA
performance occurring when the level of precarious work
is 0. The effect of precarious work on ROA turns negative
at relatively low levels of precarious work. The adoption
of precarious work then seems to be mainly a false econ-
omy, with any savings in labor costs being likely lost else-
where (Fisher & Connelly, 2017). The impact of
precarious work on flexibility, cost and financial perfor-
mance are important findings for managers whose pre-
sent behavior indicates that they incorrectly expect the
adoption of precarious work to be good for their firm.
The results from the moderation hypotheses raise
more questions than they answer for operations man-
agers with the intention to adopt these forms of work.
However, previous research suggests a positive link
between investing in HPWP and operational performance
(e.g. Fynes & Voss, 2001; Longoni et al., 2013), as do the
correlations between skill enhancement and both flexibil-
ity and cost performance in this research. In addition,
recent research indicates that by investing in HPWP
firms can reduce the negative implications of precarious
work by signaling to both precarious and secure workers
that they are valued and worth investing in Kuvaas
et al. (2013) and Riley et al. (2017). In other words, these
practices should still benefit the firm even if their role in
mitigating the impact from adopting precarious work
requires further study. Hence, we would not suggest
firms already using these practices abandon them and we
cautiously suggest they could still be of benefit for firms
adopting precarious working arrangements.
Based on empirical work in multiple other disciplines
that has provided a wealth of evidence that precarious
work harms workers (e.g., De Witte et al., 2016; Ferrie
et al., 2013; Ojala & Pyiöriä, 2019), more recent explora-
tions of HC suggest that this ultimately could harm firm
performance (e.g., Riley et al., 2017) and, on the basis of
our results, we would recommend that the adoption of
precarious work should be limited, at most. Going further
we would suggest that managers might therefore refrain
from adopting precarious working practices and instead
consider more positive (from an employee perspective)
ways to reduce costs or create flexibility. The automotive
company BMW, for example, uses a practice called
“Arbeitszeitkonto.” This is a workload account, where
employees can debit and credit up to 300 working hours
(±) working hours (Focus Money Online, 2020). Thus,
during slack periods, employees can take time off
whereas, when there is a surge in demand (credited as
extra hours), they may need to work overtime. In com-
plex manufacturing processes such practices might be
more beneficial in the long run than using precarious
workers.
6.2 | Theoretical implications
Previous research is clear that firm specific HC is a
source of competitive advantage (e.g., Crook et al., 2011).
From the traditional HC perspective, precarious workers
are considered general HC because they have skills that
are easy to acquire or replace and that do not demand a
wage premium. From this perspective, the adoption of
precarious work may lower cost or increase flexibility,
but the workers themselves are not a source of firm spe-
cific knowledge and by extension competitive advantage
or disadvantage.
There is, however, an alternative perspective that
links general HC to performance (e.g., Crook
et al., 2011). In the context of precarious work, this
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linkage would be explained by the commitment and
motivation of both the precarious and secure workforces
in their reciprocal relationship with the organization.
Specifically, precarious workers will not perform as
expected because they reciprocate for their poor wages
and lack of security with low levels of commitment and
motivation (Fehr et al., 1998). In addition, the adoption
of precarious work has spillover effects on the secure
workforce who view the adoption of precarious work as
a signal that they too might be at future risk (Riley
et al., 2017) in turn causing them to also reduce their
commitment and motivation (Eldor & Cappelli, 2020;
Riley et al., 2017). As a firm adopts more precarious
workers both the precarious and secure workforce will
reciprocate by reducing their motivation and commit-
ment; in essence firm specific knowledge is not formed
or even lost.
Our results are mostly in line with the alternative
view of general HC. We find that anything beyond a low
level of adoption of precarious work harms flexibility and
financial performance and that any level of adoption
harms cost performance. In other words, even if one
assumes that precarious jobs can be designed via poka-
yokes, and the like, to be pretty much fail safe and there-
fore that the precarious workers have no firm specific
HC, we still see negative performance impacts from
increased adoption. Our primary theoretical contribution
is to provide evidence that general HC does play a role in
competitive advantage and by extension disadvantage.
Our second theoretical contribution is to advance
knowledge on the content and operationalization of the
precarious work construct. The conceptualization and
measurement of precarious work has always been diffi-
cult due to the multidimensional nature of the construct.
In addition, previous research has generally addressed
precariousness from the perspective of the worker.
Hence, while there is previous research in management
that has explored individual dimensions of precarious
work at the firm level of analysis using managerial
respondents (e.g., Chadwick & Flinchbaugh, 2016
explored part-time work), previous research using mana-
gerial respondents has not captured all three dimensions.
Our results suggest that precarious work can be captured
using managerial respondents and that the construct is
indeed a composite.
7 | LIMITATIONS, FUTURE
RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS
This research is an early attempt to bridge the divide
between practice and (mainly analytical) operations man-
agement research which suggests precarious work is good
for the firm, and the abundant evidence that suggests
that precarious work harms workers, which should then
have negative implications for employers. We combined
a multiple respondent survey with secondary data to
explore the research questions. By using separate HR and
operations respondents we reduce potential problems
with common method bias or respondent bias (Flynn
et al., 2018). In addition, the secondary data provides
additional insight and allowed us to triangulate the
results for costs, OHS and ROA. Finally, the sample is a
good representation of the population.
Previous research and HC theory allowed us to spec-
ify precise hypotheses with nonlinear and moderating
effects, but the lack of developed measures of precarious
work at the firm level makes the operationalization of
this construct more exploratory. In addition, the sample
is also relatively small and from a single sector in a single
country. Hence, like many early studies that develop
measures and link disciplines (e.g., Das et al., 2008), our
study raises many questions for future research to
answer.
Future research should explore these results in other
contexts. For instance, future research should explore
other forms of general HC, be they jobs such as account-
ing that have a high degree of general industry knowl-
edge or investments in, for example, general education,
which the worker could take with them to another
employer if they left. Similarly, a single country study
eliminated confounds that could have occurred with dif-
ferent regulatory regimes, but future research needs to
explore if the results hold outside the UK. Finally, many
of the recent discussions of precarious workers and gig
economy workers have focused on service providers
(e.g. Kesavan et al., 2014) and platforms (e.g., Kaine &
Josserand, 2019), so future research needs to further
explore the role of precarious workers in different
contexts.
ROA, COGS and cost are all addressing different
facets of efficiency and the constructs do share some vari-
ance (e.g., the correlation between cost and ROA is .332
and highly significant). However, the varying results
based on the choice of efficiency measure also raise ques-
tions for future research. For instance, it is possible the
results for the perceptual cost measure are due to opera-
tions managers perceiving the use of precarious workers
as a sign of not being cost competitive. In other words,
the use of precarious workers could be negatively
impacting managers perceptions of cost competitiveness.
It is also possible that the varying results for the different
operationalizations of efficiency are because the balance
sheet benefit of reduced wages is not recognized by oper-
ations managers who instead experience an increase in
the amount of time spent monitoring and scheduling a
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workforce that is not committed to the organization. To
fully understand the flexibility, cost and financial perfor-
mance implications of precarious work will then require
future research to explore how adopting precarious work
changes managerial roles. Equally, it will be necessary to
explore how precarious work is captured in various oper-
ational and organizational performance metrics, because
our results suggest that the choice of efficiency measure
can change the results from adopting precarious work.
The operationalization of the precarious work con-
struct will also need significant further development
along at least two paths. First, the robustness checks sug-
gest that the various dimensions of precarious work may
not be equally impactful to the firm; with temporary con-
tracts potentially impacting firm performance the most.
These finding needs to be explored in future research
with a much larger sample that can tease out these com-
plexities. Second, future researchers will also need to
explore if this conceptualization holds across industries
and countries.
Our research design made an explicit trade-off in that
in capturing the firm level of analysis, we lose the vari-
ance in how individuals experience their jobs and the
outcomes of those experiences. Future research that cap-
tures both firm and worker perspectives simultaneously
will be needed to more fully understand the precarious
work construct as well as the impact of adopting precari-
ous work on both worker and firm outcomes.
For instance, the inconsistent results for HPWP and
the insignificant results for safety both deserve further
exploration; especially since both could be a function of
addressing precarious work using managerial respon-
dents. Specifically, it is not clear if our mostly insignifi-
cant results regarding OHS and HPWP are because the
theory is wrong, the sample is small, or because we col-
lect data from managerial respondents not individual
workers like most past research.
Addressing OHS adds to our research model, but we
are missing the workers' perspective. We tried to mitigate
this possibility by capturing the pressures of the working
environment through secondary data on breaches and
notices, but failed to get a sufficient sample size to come
to reliable conclusions. However, the limited secondary
data suggest that with a larger sample the predicted nega-
tive relationship between adopting precarious work and
OHS might be seen; future research needs to explore this
possibility. Future research should also explore if our
results are mainly due to the underreporting of accidents
by precarious workers (e.g., Probst et al., 2013). In addi-
tion, the results for OHS may also be because our mea-
sure of OHS performance assesses the potential physical
implications of precarious work, but we do not capture
psychological stress and strain; hence future research
should explore if our results are because of differences in
how we measured worker outcomes and how they have
been addressed in previous research.
We face similar issues with the results surrounding
HPWP. Given previous research on HPWP and the posi-
tive correlations between skill enhancement and both
flexibility and cost performance, we would cautiously
suggest that HPWP does deserve further study in the con-
text of precarious work, even though our results are
mainly insignificant. For instance, some percentage of
workers may prefer this type of employment; hence, their
experience and how the secure workforce responds to
their presence is bound to be different. In addition, the
workers' commitment and motivation are clearly
unmeasured intervening variables in this study. Future
research that directly measures how both precarious and
secure workers respond to both increases in precarious
work and the adoption of HPWP is needed. Similarly, we
only measured objective characteristics of precarious
work. However, it is likely that the more subjective char-
acteristics are important when looking at worker motiva-
tion and commitment. For instance, it is possible that the
influence of HPWP would be greater when workers
themselves perceive their situation as precarious.
Previous research captures some or all of the above
for individuals, at the expense of not exploring if precari-
ous work was delivering the benefits firms expected. This
research is an early attempt to explore the firm level out-
comes. However, using only managerial respondents and
secondary data could be a major reason for some of the
results; especially those surrounding HPWP and OHS.
Addressing the issues raised above requires future
research that simultaneously explores precarious work's
impact on both workers and firms. This will likely
require future research to use designs that are multilevel
or nested, to simultaneously collect either primary data
from the workers themselves or secondary data on indi-
vidual workers' performance at operational tasks and
indicators of their wellbeing such as attendance,
unplanned absences and the like.
Lastly, while we took all available precautions to
address the potential confounding impact of endogeneity
in our research and our analysis indicates that the vari-
ables are exogenous, we cannot rule out endogeneity
entirely. The results should be interpreted carefully
should endogeneity exist.
This research provides an exploration of what is a
growing phenomenon, precarious work. Recent eco-
nomic developments have resulted in an altered opera-
tional approach to contracting workers in a just-as-
required mode. The switch from a full-time resource to a
temporary on call resource has in many cases resulted in
precarious working conditions, where the employers
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seem to be reaping all the benefits. In this paper, we have
investigated this phenomenon to explore if these benefits
do really exist and if they impact on the OM domain.
This paper is one of the first that introduces the growing
societal practice of precarity into the OM domain.
We have identified that the assumed benefits of pre-
carious work for the firm are at best overstated. At low
levels of adoption, the expected improvements in flexibil-
ity and ROA are observed, though with an increase in
costs. However, as the level of adoption increases, perfor-
mance against these attributes diminishes. In addition,
while the increased adoption of precarious work does not
harm occupational health and safety, it also does
not improve it. In conclusion, this suggests that the
increase in these forms of work is not benefiting firms in
the expected manner. Given the harm these forms of
work cause to workers and society, this suggests that pre-
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ENDNOTES
1 The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service for businesses
and employees in the UK states that zero hour contracts are
employment contracts with no guaranteed hours. This means that
employees are not guaranteed any work by their employers (and
therefore no pay). Business leaders have supported the adoption
of such contracts, since they provide a flexible labour market.
Trade union groups have raised concerns about the potential
exploitation of employees, as well as about how workers can ade-
quately assert their employment rights (ACAS, 2020).
2 https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/data/national/fame.
3 https://resources.hse.gov.uk/notices/default.asp.
4 As indicated in Appendix A, we only included workers that were
aged 25 years or over in order to exclude entry level or first-time
workers such as students.
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APPENDIX A.: SURVEY QUESTIONS
Questions for HR managers
Number of manufacturing sites
At how many locations does your company have
manufacturing sites?
Number of operational workers
Approximately, how many operational workers have
worked at your company in the last 12 months?
Employment structure
Which of the following types of operational workers, if
any, have worked at your company in the last 12 months?
1. Permanent workers on either a full or part-time basis




5. Zero hour workers
Employees organized in trade-unions
What percentage of your company's permanent opera-
tional workers (i.e., full-time and part-time) are orga-
nized members in trade-unions?
What percentage of your company's fixed-term con-
tract (i.e., full-time and part-time) operational workers
are organized members in trade-unions?
Wage
For each of the following types of workers who are aged
25 and over that have worked at your company in the
previous 12 months, <insert types of works>, are
the majority paid above the legal minimum wage of
£7.20? Firstly…
1. Permanent workers on either a full or part-time basis




5. Zero hour workers
Investors in people standard
Does your company currently hold the following
certification?
1. IIP (If necessary – Investors in People Standard)
Occupational health & safety
Thinking about all the occupational accidents amongst
your <INSERT # of operational workers> opera-
tional workers at your company in the last
12 months, how many accidents occurred in that
period?
Thinking about all the disabilities due to occupational
injury or illness amongst your <INSERT # of opera-
tional workers> operational workers at your company
in the last 12 months, how many days were spent due
to this?
Empowerment enhancing bundles
Thinking about some specific practices, to what extent
does your company allow or adopt to the following prac-
tices for each type of operational worker at your com-
pany, please answer using the following scale with
1 being not at all, 4 being to some extent and 7 being to a
great extent, you can use any number in-between.
Firstly…
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Skill enhancing bundles
Thinking about skill enhancement amongst your workers,
to what extent does your company practice the following
initiatives for each type of operational worker at your com-
pany, please answer using the following scale with 1 being
not at all, 4 being to some extent and 7 being to a great
extent, you can use any number in-between. Firstly…
Questions for operations managers
Operations managers also responded to the questions
used to construct our precarious work measure: For such
questions, please see questions for HR managers, regard-
ing employment structure, employees organized in trade-
unions, and wage.
Operational performance
For the following items, please rate your business'
operational performance in comparison to your major
competitors. On a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = far below com-
petitors, 4 = on par, 7 far above competitors).
Cost performance
1. Direct manufacturing costs
2. Total product costs
3. Raw material costs
4. Labor unit costs
Please note, the following error terms were covaried: The
errors of items 2 and 3.
Flexibility
1. Flexibility to change output volume
2. Flexibility to change product mix
3. Manufacturing throughput time











Operational workers are involved in
influencing work process/outcomes
Self-managed or autonomous work groups
Operational workers participation in
decision making
Systems to encourage feedback from our
operational workers











Extensive training programs are provided
for our operational workers.
Our operational workers will normally go
through training programs every few
years.
There are formal training programs to
teach our new operational workers the
skills they need to perform their job.
Formal training programs are offered to
our operational workers in order to
increase their opportunities to promotion
in this facility.
Please note, the following error terms were covaried: The error of item 4 was covaried with the errors of items 2 and 3.
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Please note, the following error terms were covaried: The
errors of items 7 and 8.
APPENDIX B.: SECONDARY DATA MEASURE
FOR COST PERFORMANCE
We developed an alternative secondary measure for cost
performance, which we call COGS performance. For this,
we used a company's COGS divided by its same year sales
and adjusted this measure by one-digit industry means
(please note—the results are insensitive to whether we
use one- or two-digit SIC codes). We then multiplied this
measure by 1, so that a higher value indicates better
COGS performance. One extreme maximum value was
detected in the data. For consistency, we excluded the
maximum and the minimum value before estimation. We
note that cost performance and our measure of COGS
TABLE B1 Regression precarious work and COGS performance (N = 91)
Variables
COGS performance 2017
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
















































































































Empowerment  precarious work .004
(0.003)
Skill enhancement  precarious work .006*
(0.002)
Intercept 0.032 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.053
R2 0.805 0.806 0.807 0.808 0.813
ΔR2 0.805** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005*
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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performance are not significantly correlated (Table B1,
r = .139, p = .256). Results with respect to the estimates
of interest are insignificant. For robustness, we included
a cubic term of precarious work, yet we find that the
cubic term does not significantly improve the model.
APPENDIX C.: IMPLICATIONS OF COMPOSITE
IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS: IMPACT OF
INDIVIDUAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRECARIOUS WORK
Similar to the matter of difference scores, the use of
(equally weighted) composite scores can suffer from some
methodological problems (Edwards & Parry, 1993), as the
dimensions are constrained to be equal in magnitude and
sign. Subsequently, we followed the procedure suggested
by Edwards and Parry (1993) that relaxes such con-
straints through the use of polynomial regression equa-
tion. The procedure considers the dimensions of the
composite instead of the composite itself. It requires
developing an unconstrained equation that includes all
three dimensions separately as well as their squares and
interaction products.
Table C2 below lists the estimates obtained from the
constrained and unconstrained equations and compares
R2 values—please note, all control variables were
included. We start by comparing the R2 values of the con-
strained and unconstrained equations and find the R2
values of the constraint equations predicting flexibility
and occupational health & safety performance to be
higher than the R2 values obtained by the unconstrained
equations. Yet, the R2 of the unconstrained cost perfor-
mance equations appears to be higher than for the con-
strained equation. We then conducted an F-test to test for
the significance in R2 differences, with nonsignificant
results for cost performance. Next, given that some of the
insignificant estimates of the linear terms point into dif-
ferent directions, we tested whether the differences
between such estimates are significant. None of these dif-
ferences were significantly different from zero at p > .30.
These findings are corroborated by the insignificance of
all linear predictor variables and their higher-order
terms, with the exception of the interaction term of low
earnings and employee representation predicting cost
performance. Given these results, we conclude that the
overall constraints imposed by the linear and squared
composite score of precarious work represents the indi-
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Model 2 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5
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APPENDIX E.: RESULTS OBTAINED FOR THE COMPOSITES OF PRECARIOUS WORK WITH AND
WITHOUT AGENCY WORKERS IN ITS OPERATIONALIZATION









Model 2 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)




















Intercept 5.053** 5.697** 0.925* 0.080**
R2 0.121 0.247 0.351 0.702
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.









Model 2 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5







































































Model 2 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5

































Intercept 5.178** 6.404** 2.671 0.185**
R2 0.098 0.213 0.152 0.712
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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Model 2 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5
β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE)
































Intercept 5.254** 6.252** 2.540 0.176**
R2 0.101 0.220 0.163 0.702
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
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Model 2 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5













































Intercept 4.973** 6.381** 2.610 0.178**
R2 0.068 0.258 0.560 0.338
Note: ±, mean-centered values.
*Significance at .05 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
**Significance at .01 level; values below .001 are shown as .001.
FIGURE G1 Binned scatterplot for cost performance and
precarious work
FIGURE G2 Binned scatterplot for flexibility performance and
precarious work
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APPENDIX H.: SELECTED COMPANY CASES
WITH MEAN-CENTERED PRECARIOUS WORK
VALUES CLOSEST TO THE TURNING POINT
VALUES ESTIMATED ROA AND FLEXIBILITY
PERFORMANCE
Table H7 is indicative of the large number of possible
combinations of earnings, employee representation, and
temporary contracts within firms of the same (or similar)
precarious work values. For example, company
1,010,112,265 relies on relatively more zero-hour workers
than company 1,010,110,407. However, due to company
1010112265's compensation of this worker category, it
arrives at the same value of precarious work then com-
pany 1,010,110,407. Furthermore, it is interesting to
observe that all four companies closest to the respective
turning points have no permanent (sample average 9.02,
min = 0; max = 100) or fixed term (sample average 2.18,
min = 0; max = 100) employees organized in labor
unions.
FIGURE G3 Binned scatterplot for OHS performance and
precarious work
FIGURE G4 Binned scatterplot for ROA2017 and
precarious work
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